Market Adoption
Analyzes market capitalization relative to leading peers in the same category, serving as a proxy for market confidence and the issuer's incentive to address material deficiencies.
Scoring divides the protocol's market cap by the category median, with assets grouped into peer categories: Stable–Base, Stable–Alt, LST, LRT, and Wrapped. The asymmetric range reflects market cap's nature as a noisy proxy: it can confirm absence of obvious risk but cannot substitute for direct evaluation of reserve quality, governance, or legal structure.
| Tier | Market Size vs. Peers (% of median) | Reasoning | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Category leader | 25% to 100%+ | Convergence of liquidity depth (thicker secondary markets, tighter spreads, larger natural arbitrageur base), continuous regulatory and analyst scrutiny that forces institutional-grade standards, and revealed preference of due-diligence-driven counterparties, all structurally risk-reducing. | Top-quintile protocols within each category historically show lower rates of critical security incidents per dollar deployed than the bottom quartile (Halborn 2023, CertiK 2024). USDC absorbed approximately $3B in net redemptions over 72 hours following the SVB collapse without structural failure. |
| Established baseline | 10% to 25% | Sufficient scale to demonstrate operational viability, attract institutional integrations, and maintain meaningful liquidity depth under normal conditions. | Examples: LUSD, FRAX, PYUSD in stablecoin categories; rETH, swETH in LSTs. |
| Transitional | 5% to 10% | Real, functional protocol with material market presence, but adoption level has not been tested against a category-wide stress event. | Examples: newer LRT protocols, recently-launched RWA wrappers in the 12–18 months following launch. |
| Fragility zone | Sub-5% of category median | Convergence of three risk factors at small relative scale: liquidity fragility (thin secondary markets amplify exits into runs), operational resource constraints (limited budget for audits, incident response, controls), and counterparty concentration. | Iron Finance held $2B at peak but its collateral base was structurally thin. Small relative scale within a category produces thin secondary-market depth and weak arbitrage support, amplifying losses under redemption pressure. Mai Finance and various pre-2022 algorithmic stablecoins demonstrated this dynamic. |