Circuit Breaker Sophistication
Evaluates how quickly and reliably the protocol can halt fund-touching activity during an attack. Detection-to-halt latency, scope coverage, and separation of pauser authority from upgrade authority are the primary inputs.
| Tier | Reasoning | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Manual, poorly scoped pause | An attack can complete in seconds; a manual pause typically takes minutes-to-hours to assemble, and if the pauser and admin keys are co-located, the same compromise that triggers the need for a circuit breaker can disable it. | Twenty-six documented circuit breaker failures (2016–April 2026) total approximately $3.5B in net realized losses. Drift (April 2026, $285M drained over two hours) and Kelp DAO (April 2026, $292M out before the 46-minute manual pause) anchor the latency failure mode. |
| Semi-automated with partial scope | Partial automation reduces latency but incomplete scope leaves fund-touching surfaces uncovered; a pause that cannot reach the exploited contract produces false security. | Wrong-scope pause anchors this failure mode: Curve's emergency DAO (July 2023) was unable to pause Vyper pools, and Balancer V2 had expired pause windows. |
| Fully automated, on-chain invariant-triggered | Autonomous on-chain triggers fire within a block on coded conditions, collapsing detection-to-halt latency. Pause scope must cover the actual fund-touching surface, and pauser authority must be separate from upgrade authority. | ERC-7265 implementations, Chainlink CCIP Risk Management Network, and Sui validator-level freeze (Cetus May 2025, which captured $162M of $223M) anchor the top tier. |